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EXODUS:
40 YEARS OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZA TION AND THE
FAILED PROMISE OF COMMUNITY-BASED CARE
TED FRANKELt

ABSTRACT

The increasing number of Canadians with mental illness who are left
uncared.for and roaming the streets represents a huge failing that is not
being seriously addressed in our society. Initially thought to be humane
and progressive, "deinstitutionalization" has resulted in a very different reality for thousands of people with mental illness who have been
released into the community. Many of those liberated from mental
institutions and asylums have made an uneasy transition to life on the
"outside", sometimes with tragic consequences.
The question for consumers of mental health services now is not
whether the current .system isfailing but rather what is the best route to
programs and entitlements that are routinely granted to other disadvantaged groups, such as people wUh physical disabilities. Claims
grounded in Charter section 15 jurisprudence that mentally ill populations are underserved by existing aftercare programs are one possibility, although Canadian courts have shown a marked reluctance to
interfere in the realm ofpolicy-making. In the end only a restructuring
of priorities - political, social and attitudinal can fully address the
needs of some of our least understood and empowered citizens, as the
experience of one Canadian jurisdiction, Nova Scotia, demonstrates so
well.

t

Ted Frankel graduated from McGill University in 1997 with a B.A. in History and from
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Moses said to the people, "Remember this day, when you left Egypt,
that slave-pen; for sheer strength the Eternal brought you out of this
place ... (and) swore to your fathers He would give you a land abounding in milk and honey ... "
Exodus 13:3

The themes of enslavement and bondage are ones familiar to individuals
who suffer from mental illness. There is the bondage of the mind,
especially for those who suffer from depression, mood swings, hallucinations, delusions, and other afflictions. There is the bondage of the
spirit, occasioned by prejudice, discrimination, stigma, and
marginalization the result of hatred, intolerance, and simple misunderstanding of mental disability by those who have never felt its grip.
Finally, and perhaps most devastating of all, there is the bondage and
subjugation of body and soul which comes when one is institutionalized,
a process which involves not only the physical aspect of living apart
from family, friends, and neighbours but also the psychological trauma
of subordinating one's autonomy one's very free will - to the interests
of treatment, rehabilitation and recovery.
For the last forty years there has been a movement afoot to end the
bondage of forced hospitalization and move towards treatment alternatives which are less restrictive and more humane. Called
"deinstitutionalization" by some, this movement has seen a veritable
exodus of psychiatric in-patients from hospitals to seek a new life in the
community. Yet deinstitutionalization for the thousands who have been
liberated from psychiatric institutions has meant something more than
the simple act of leaving. It has meant the promise of community-based
care with the ultimate goal of reintegration, and it has meant the challenge of moving forward when these promises have proved hollow.
This article will endeavour to unpack the many dimensions of
deinstitutionalization and assess how far we have come in realizing the
goal of effective, benevolent community-based care and treatment. In
doing so, deinstitutionalization will be examined as a social construct, a
policy choice, a legal right, and as a legacy of thousands of individuals
with mental illness, to be measured in human terms. Although I will
look at deinstitutionalization broadly as a social and legal phenomenon
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taking place across Canada and the United States, the efforts of Nova
Scotia to implement community-based care as a viable substitute for
institutionalization will be examined more closely.
Part II will look at the foundations of deinstitutionalization, including legislative efforts made to provide for individuals in the community,
and the often dire consequences of failing to live up to these responsibilities, which include homelessness and violence.
Whether or not a right to community-based care and/or basic aftercare' exists at all for disabled people in Canada will be addressed in Part
III, with a comparison made between claims made under the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and jurisprudence from the United States on the
same topic.
Since deinstitutionalization cannot be fully understood apart from
its context in Canadian lives and communities, Part IV fixes a critical
gaze on Nova Scotia, examining the legislative framework for mental
health services in the province, how this has translated into uncertainty
for Nova Scotians who have been discharged from hospitals and institutions, and what efforts have been made to restructure priorities and
make more of existing resources.
The paper will conclude with a look at the potential for individuals
with mental illness who have been wronged by the system to bring civil
actions against the government and/or care providers. Possibilities for
legislative reform, such as inserting a guarantee of the "least restrictive
alternative" in relevant provincial statutes or passing a Patients' Bill of
Rights, will also be canvassed in Part V.

II.

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION,

p AST

AND PRESENT

The traditional asylum system, favoured throughout the 19th century,
became even more entrenched after the turn of the century. Mental
hospitals had already grown considerably by the end of World War
The term "aftercare" is used to denote a panoply of care and treatment services individuals
may require after being discharged from hospital including: counseling, case management,
vocational and skills training, substance abuse therapy, education, crisis management, help
with daily living, etc ..
1
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Two, when thousands of new beds were added to accommodate an
influx of patients from the battlefields of Europe and Asia. 2 Nine thousand new psychiatric beds were introduced in Ontario alone during the
period from 1932 and 1948. 3
While reliance on the system increased at a rapid pace, funding
levels did not. Mental institutions quickly became overcrowded and
patients suffered as a result - a fact that did not go unnoticed by social
reformers and journalists of the day. In the United States, Albert
Deutsch wrote about appalling conditions in mental hospitals in his
book The Shame of the States. 4 His sentiments were echoed by newsmen
across the U.S., some of whom compared the mental wards of hospitals
to Nazi concentration camps. 5
Criticism of the asylum approach also began to surface within the
medical profession. Some, like Dr. Harry Solomon, President of the
American Psychiatric Association, wondered aloud whether institutions
that housed people with mental illness had not become "antiquated,
outmoded and ... obsolete." 6 Thanks to new and revolutionary psychotropic medications, psychiatrists observed a new sense of calm prevailing in mental wards. New medications also helped control many of the
violent behaviours which made doctors reluctant to prescribe anything
other than long-term confinement for patients with schizophrenia and
severe mood disorders. 7 If medication could put to rest many of the
"worst" symptoms of mental illness, psychiatrists hypothesized that
even their most chronic patients would now be able to function in the
community. With public administrators chafing at the high costs of
maintaining and staffing psychiatric facilities, the pressure was on to get
the "social experiment" underway. The deinstitutionalization movement was born.
2

See M. Drassinower & S. Levine, "More Sinned Against Than Sinning: Housing, Mental
Illness and Disability" ( 1995) 6 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 91 at 101-103
[Drassinower & Levine, "Sinned"].
3 Ibid. at 102.
4
Albert Deutsch, The Shame of the States (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1948).
5 R.J. Issac & V.C. Armat, Madness in the Streets: How Psychiat1y and the Laiv Abandoned
the Mentally fl/ (New York: The Free Press, 1990) at 68 [Issac & Armat].
6
Ibid. at 69, quoting from Dr. Solomon's 1958 presidential address to the American Psychiatric Association.
7
Chlorpromazine, thought to be a miracle drug for the treatment of schizophrenia, was first
introduced in 1952. Issac & An11at, supra note 5 at 20.
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1. Civil Rights and the Mentally Ill
Thousands of anti-war and equality rights protesters took to the streets
during the 1960s, seeking more accountability from government and an
end to the tyranny of the majority. Many in the counter-culture saw the
mentally ill as sharing in the same struggle. Calling mental illness a
myth, civil libertarians argued that mental institutions were little more
than holding bins for dissidents and others who threatened the existing
power structure. 8 They viewed psychiatry as a tool of oppression and
called for mental hospitals to be shut down and its population set free.
Although their strength in numbers was new, much of the rhetoric
employed by civil libertarians was not. Over 100 years earlier, John
Stuart Mill wrote that "the only purpose for which power can rightfully
be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others." 9 This message resonated with activists and also with prominent philosophers like Michael Foucault, who
spoke out against the "moral imprisonment" brought on by institutional
living. Io If mental illness was little more than an unorthodox way of
seeing the world, and posed no threat except to the establishment itself,
then the coercive power of the state could not be justified.
The libertarian teachings of Mill also struck a chord with what R. J.
Issac and V. C. Annat call the "anti-psychiatry" movement. I I Composed
of renegade psychiatrists like R.D. Laing and Thomas Szasz, antipsychiatrists theorized that what other scientists considered a "brain
disease" was better explained as a social phenomenon brought on by a
host of familial, cultural, and socio-economic factors. Accordingly,
"anti-psychiatrist" psychiatrists argued that locking individuals away in
8

Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at 26-27.
J.S. Mill, "On Liberty" in S. Collini, ed., On Liberty and Other Writings (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989) 8 at 13. Mill goes on to qualify that self-determination "is
meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of
children or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or
womanhood" (ibid.) This passage is sometimes cited by those who favour paternalistic
interventions for the mentally ill. Like children, the argument goes, mentally disordered
persons lack insight and the ability to make reasoned decisions about their own lives. This
makes it necessary for the state to intervene.
10 Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at 52, citing M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A Hist01y
of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York: Pantheon, 1965) at 247-248.
11
Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at 19-64.

9
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order to "rescue them from themselves" only served to perpetuate
feelings of low self-esteem that caused psychic disturbances in the first
place. This notion was also given credence by literary works of the day,
most notably Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest.

2. Legislative Action and Inaction

Legislators were quick to respond to calls for deinstitutionalization, and
the effects were immediate and long-lasting. For example, between
1965 and 1975 the in-patient population at Hamilton (Ontario) Psychiatric Hospital went from 1750 to 700. By 1995 only 211 in-patient beds
remained. 12 Similar developments occurred across the country, including at the Nova Scotia Hospital in Dartmouth, where beds have been
reduced from over 1000 in the 1960s to only 186 today. 13
In the United States, the federal government helped champion
deinstitutionalization efforts. In 1963, during the Presidency of John F.
Kennedy, Congress passed the Mental Retardation and Community
Mental Health Centers Construction Act. 14 The centrepiece of the new
legislation was federal funding for thousands of Community Mental
Health Centers (CMHCs) where former in-patients could receive counseling, vocational training and a variety of other services aimed at
easing the transition from hospitalization to community living.
Kennedy's plan envisioned the CMHCs assuming a dominant role in
mental health care, making hospitalization, for all but the most chronic
patients, a thing of the past. 15 Sure enough, state hospitals began to
phase out beds as CMHCs were introduced. 16
12
F. Vallance-Jones, "Left adrift in the community" The [Hamilton] Spectator (13 May 2000)
Al3 [Vallance-Jones].
13
R. Bland & B. Dufton, Mental Health: A Time for Action (Province of Nova Scotia:
Submitted to the Deputy Minister of Health, 2000) at 32 [Bland & Dufton].
14
42 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1963).
15 See Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at 77-81; J. Bach, "Requiring Due Care in the Process of
Patient Deinstitutionalization: Toward a Common Approach to Mental Health Care Reform"
(1989) The Yale Journal 1153 at 1155 [Bach, "Deinstitutionalization"].
16
For example, the average population at psychiatric hospitals in the state of Maryland
declined from 7,114 to 1,200 between 1970 and 1997: Williams v. Wasserman 164 F. Supp.
2d. 591 (D.Md. 2001). This trend was replicated across the country. The number of inpatient
beds in state mental hospitals decreased from 559, 000 to 132, 000 between 1955 and 1980.
See Bach, "Deinstitutionalization", ibid. at 1155-1156.
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While regulators made good on their promise to close down mental
hospitals, they were slow to provide the kind of support and case
management former patients needed to adjust to their new surroundings.
The pace of deinstitutionalization outstripped the development of new
community-based resources. By 1970, consumer-rights groups in
Ontario were already publicizing the fact that out-patient services were
lacking in the province. 17 In the United States, fewer than 700 of the
2,500 planned CMHCs had been built as of 1989. 18 By the end of the
1980s, lawsuits had been launched in twenty-one states, demanding
state governments provide more services for the mentally ill. 19

3. The Aftermath of Deinstitutionalization
Deinstitutionalization was premised on the notion that people with
mental illness would be better served in the community than they had as
shut-aways in psychiatric wards. Instead of psychiatrists and nurses,
people with mental illness could take comfort in friends, neighbours,
employers, social workers, and family doctors. Instead of enduring
cramped and chaotic hospital living, newly liberated patients could live
in their own apartment or semi-autonomously at a supervised care
home.
For many of those who have left institutions in the last forty years,
however, deinstitutionalization has delivered much less than it promised. More often than not, the transition to community living has proved
to be difficult, even disastrous. Instead of the welcoming anns of the
community, many leaving mental institutions have found themselves
increasingly shunned, isolated, and marginalized. The reality of the
"outside" has, in fact, often proven to be more harsh than what many
experienced in the institutional care system. According to consumer
advocate Carol Tooton, the situation is so bleak for some people there is
a temptation to romanticize their time in hospital where "at least I had a
roof over my head and food in my stomach."20
Drassinower & Levine, "Sinned", supra note 2 at I 05.
Bach, "Deinstitutionalization", supra note 15atI156.
19
Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at 309.
20
Interview of Carol Tooton, Executive Director of Canadian Mental Health Association
(CMHA), Halifax Branch (14 February 2002) by author [Tooton].
17
18
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One of the more visible by-products of deinstitutionalization gone
wrong is homelessness. As Issac and Armat write of the American
experience: "many of our modem institutions for the mentally ill exist in
the open air: parks, alleys, vacant lots, steam grates on our city pavements."21 The situation is no different in Canada. Recent studies estimate that between 20-25% of individuals living on Canadian streets
suffer from some form of mental illness. 22
Certainly not all formerly institutionalized patients have found
themselves left in the lurch by an uncaring system. In Ontario alone
there are 335 community-based mental health agencies providing a
range of crisis management and treatment programs, as well as helping
people with mental illness find shelter. 23 Recognizing the appalling lack
of affordable housing across Canada, the federal government pledged
millions in December 1999 towards building new community-based
homes for the mentally ill as part of its "Homeless Initiative."24 The
Initiative has already benefited some previously left out in the cold. For
example, with the assistance of nearly $1.4 million from the Government of Canada, a new apartment building recently opened on
Gottingen Street in Halifax, complete with independent quarters for
eighteen individuals described as "difficult to house", and a live-in staff
person available twenty-four hours a day.
Still, it remains more common to find discharged psychiatric patients living in sub-standard boarding homes, eating rancid sardines, and
getting little or no attention from psychiatrists (as Dr. Nancy Herman
observed in her 1985 doctoral thesis), than living in comfortable apartments like the units described above. 25 Wait lists are common for most

Issac & Armat, supra note 5 at I. Studies estimate that 20-25% of homeless people in
America have a "serious mental illness." Online: National Resource Center on Homelessness
and Mental Illness <http://www.nrchmi.com> (date accessed: 23 March 2002).
22
Online: CBC Frontline <http://www.tv.cbc.ca/witness/mental/mentalhome.htm> (date accessed: 23 March 2002).
23 Vallance-Jones, supra note 12 at Al3.
24
Human Resources and Development Canada, News Release 01-09, "New Housing Facility
in Halifax to receive funding" (12 March 2001). Of the $753 million devoted to the Homeless
Initiative, $305 million was designated for the Supporting Communities Partnership Initiative
(SCPI), a plan to "develop local solutions to ... the homeless challenges (of local communities)
and establish a seamless web of supports for the homeless population."
25
Vallance-Jones, supra note 12 at A13. See also P. Capponi, "Legal issues in psychiatric
boarding homes" (1986) 4 Just Cause No. I at 18.
21
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placements and programs in Nova Scotia. 26 Where there are available
spots, patients are often at the mercy of care facility administrators who
get to "pick-and-choose" the residents. 27 This sort of discrimination is
actually facilitated by the Homes for Special Care Act, which gives
maximum discretion to administrators to determine who is suitable. 28
The frustration of being stigmatized as unmanageable or dangerous
by a care home operator, living in slum-like conditions, or spending
your days in a cardboard home beneath the Gardiner Expressway in
Toronto, 29 is palpable to anyone who has ever met a mentally ill person
in these circumstances. Sometimes this frustration manifests in selfde structi ve behaviour. Unfortunately, this is the side of
deinstitutionalization best known to the general public, propagated
through splashy headlines about discharged patients throwing themselves in front of subways and wandering aimlessly through the
streets. 3° Contrariwise, the general public does not often hear about
individuals who have adjusted well, become consumer advocates, or
staited their own business, for example. 31
The sense of despair engendered by years of being ignored and
marginalized has also driven some ex-psychiatric patients to extreme
acts of violence. Some of these cases have been high profile and have
prompted criticism of deillstitutionalization policies. In 1985 a public
outcry resulted when fonner psychiatric patient Andrew LeystonHughes murdered 23-year-old heiress Nancy Eaton. 32 Concern was
similarly widespread in 1995 after Jeffrey Arenburg shot Ottawa sportscaster Brian Smith while suffering from paranoid delusions. 33
26
Interview of Pam Townsend, A. Supervisor at the Department of Community Services,
Community Supports for Adults Division (15 March 2002) by author [Townsend].
27
Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 18.
28
N.S. Reg. 73/93, s. 15(5). According to s. 13, the Minister "may" appoint a committee to
review admission decisions if there is a dispute over what level of care is appropriate for a
given individual.
29
These observations are based on my experiences in Toronto as a volunteer at the Queen
Street Mental Health Centre in 1998-1999 and as a low income advocate at the Daily Bread
Food Bank in 2000.
30
Issac & A1mat, supra note 5 at 157.
31
For a list of"Psychiatric Survivor Economic Initiatives" in Ontario see online: The Ontario
Council for Alternative Businesses <http://www.icomm.ca/ocab/psced.htm> (date accessed:
17 April 2002).
32
K. Harris, "Delicate Balancing Act; Ontario Review Board Weighs Rights to Freedom,
Safety" The [Ottawa] Sun (8 July 2001) 8.
33 K. Harris, "Troubled Road to Tragic Act; The warning signs of a desperately sick man were
there, yet Arenburg remained untreated" The [Ottawa] Sun (31 May 2001) 4.
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In the wake of Smith's death, debate intensified over when and how
psychiatric patients with violent pasts should be released into the community. In response, the Ontario government amended the Health Care
Act to allow psychiatrists to issue Community Treatment Orders (CTOs)
for individuals who have been hospitalized on more than one occasion
after being released what some call the revolving door syndrome. 34
Known as "Brian's Law" the amendments make it possible for police to
take someone into custody if they fail to comply with a treatment
order. 35
While answering the need for greater supervision of individuals
released from the hospital, the new amendments did not address many of
the root causes of the "revolving door" syndrome; such as, failing
community supports, a lack of early intervention, and little or no affordable housing. In fact, in some ways, CTOs stand in the way of healthy
community treatment. According to a Position Paper by the Ontario
Division of the Canadian Mental Health Association (CMHA), imposing a treatment order without the patient's consent "diminishes trust and
true cooperation between caregiver and patient and may be a deterrent to
the fonnation of a therapeutic relationship" because of the debilitating
side effects of many medications. 36 Still, when CTOs and leave certificates37 are issued in conjunction with a plan to utilize community
supports, they have proven to be a positive step in the lives of patients. 38

III. Do DISABLED INDIVIDUALS HAVE A RIGHT TO
COMMUNITY-BASED CARE?

The failure of provincial governments to deliver on community care
begs the question of whether the right to community-based care exists at
34

Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, as am. by S.O. 2000 c. 9. Repeat hospitalization
must occur within a three-year span to a CTO to be issued.
35
Ibid. at s. 33.3(3).
36
Canadian Mental Health Association, Position Paper Regarding the Use of Community
Treatment Orders for Persons with Mental Illness by the Public Policy Committee (Ontario
Division, 1998) at 3.
37
Unlike CTO's, leave certificates are issued only with the patient's consent. Currently, five
provinces and one territory have leave provisions within their mental health legislation.
38
J. Gray, M. A. Shone & P. Liddle, Canadian Mental Health Law Policy (Toronto:
Butterworths, 2000) at 221-223 [Gray, Shone & Liddle].
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all, or whether this is merely a "political" question which the courts
should not address. In this respect, the experience of physically disabled
claimants who have sought additional rights and entitlements through
the courts is instructive. This part considers whether people with mental
illness have a "right" to comprehensive aftercare, or at least a right to
treatment on par with that offered to others, and whether sections 7 and
15 of the Charter can be relied on to assert these rights. In order to
contrast the largely unsuccessful experience of disabled Canadian
claimants, this part will also look at the right-based approach of American courts.

1. Section 15 Jurisprudence

Efforts to secure a greater commitment by the government vis-a-vis
community care and programming might be pursued by way of Charter
challenges. A claim that mental health consumers are being underserved
by existing aftercare treatment programs, for example, could be supported by s. 15 of the Charter, which states that:
( 1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on ... mental or
physical disability.
(2) Subsection (I) does not preclude any law, program, or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged
individuals or groups including those who are disadvantaged because
of. .. mental or physical disability. 39

In order to lodge a successful s. 15 claim, the mental health claimant
would have to demonstrate that she is being denied "equal benefit of the
law" as a result of her mental disability. Since discriminatory treatment
is judged through a comparative approach, it would be necessary to
contrast the experience of mentally ill persons with that of another
"similarly situated" group. 40 The relevant comparator group would
39

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
40
See Law v. Canada (iVfinister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] S.C.J. No. 12
(S.C.C.), (QL) [Law].
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likely be people with physical disabilities who are also in the position of
requiring aftercare upon release from hospital. Where public housing
and/or social assistance is concerned, the relevant comparator would be
all others entitled to the benefit. 41
In Nova Scotia in particular, some consumer advocates make the
claim that individuals with physical disabilities have better access to
aftercare programs and services than individuals with mental illness,
although there is little quantitative evidence to back this up. For example, in his report on the Nova Scotia Community Based Options
system of housing, Dr. Michael Kendrick notes a "net preference and
priority in terms of people who get served" for individuals with intellectual or physical impairments. 42 This imbalance is also evident in vocational and skills-training programs which are better equipped to assist
those with physical disabilities, although enrollment is often higher
among the mentally ill. 43
Still, using s. 15 to demand services on par with individuals who are
physically disabled would be an uphill climb for mental health consumers. To succeed, differences in treatment would have to be tied directly
to the functional values of the legislation. If the differential treatment
reflects a stereotype about mentally ill persons or promotes the view that
these individuals are less worthy of respect or dignity a Charter remedy
may be granted, but otherwise the court will not "second guess policy
decisions. " 44

See e.g. Alcoholism Foundation v. Winnipeg [1990] M.J. No. 212 (M.C.A.) (QL), where a
by-law making it illegal to build two group homes within a hundred metres of each other
was found unconstitutional.
12
M. Kendrick, An Independent Evaluation of the Nova Scotia Community Based Options
Community Residential Service System (Province of Nova Scotia: Prepared for the Nova
Scotia Department of Community Services) at 153 [Kendrick]. Dr. Kendrick goes on to say
:hat "[i]t was not possible for this evaluator to statistically verify this possibility though such
m exercise would be useful."
u Tooton gives the example of Nova Scotia's Employability Assistance for People with
Disabilities Initiative (EAPD) program which helps persons with disabilities accomplish
;econdary education. Although the majority of people in the program have mental health
.ssues, Tooton notes that only one expert on staff specializes in this area. "When is the light
;;oing to go on?," she says.
14
Per Iacobucci J.: "human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized,
.gnored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and
;;roups within Canadian society." Law, supra note 40. See also Law Society British Columbia
v. Andrews [1989] S.C.J. No. 6 at para. 65 (S.C.C.), (QL).

11
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Recent s. 15 jurisprudence on the rights of physically disabled
claimants demonstrates the pitfalls of using the Charter to challenge
administrative decision-making with respect to aftercare. In the vast
majority of these cases, the court has paid deference to ministerial
judgment in allocating funds and developing service priorities. As long
as discretion is exercised in a reasonable, non-capricious manner, the
director or administrator of a social assistance plan,45 extended care
programme,46 or nursing home47 will escape Charter scrutiny.
Budget considerations are also given significant weight by the court.
Canadian courts have consistently held that limited resources will excuse the government from accommodating everyone or accommodating
everyone to the extent they would like. 48 This was the case in Fernandes
v. Manitoba (Director of Social Services) where the Court held that it
was not discriminatory to withhold funding for the severely disabled
plaintiff to hire an expensive home care attendant, even though it meant
an extended hospital stay for an individual who qualified for a government-sponsored program which would have enabled him to live in the
community. Fernandes is one in a long line of cases where the Court has
taken a hands-off approach where "political" decision-making and
choices that "affect the public purse" are on the table. 49
Another possibility for mental health consumers would be to follow
the Eldridge line of cases and argue that, although most aftercare
programs do not purposely exclude the mentally ill, the manner in which
these services are carried out has the effect of discriminating against
people with mental health issues. 50 As Laforest J. notes in Eldridge:
"the government will rarely single out disabled persons for discrimina-

45

See Conradv. Halifax (County) [1993] N.S.J. No. 342 (N.S.S.C.) (QL) [Conrad].
See R.R. v. Alberta (Child Welfare Appeal Panel) [2000] A.J. No. 580 (A.Q.B.) (QL) [R.R.].
47
See Ontario Nursing Home Association v. Ontario (HCJ) [1990] 0.J. No. 2042 (O.H.C.J.)
(QL).
48
See e.g. Lovelace v. Ontario [2000] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.) (QL).
49
( 1992), 78 Man. R. (2d) 172 [Fernandes]. See also Law, supra note 40; Lovelace, ibid. note
48; Miron v. Trudel [1995] S.C.J. No. 44 (S.C.C.) (QL); Compare Egan v. Canada [1995] 2
S.C.R. 513.
50
So-called "adverse effect" discrimination has been recognized by the Court in a number of s.
15 Charter challenges. See e.g. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General}, [1997] S.C.J.
No. 86 (S.C.C.) (QL) [Eldridge]; Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 S.C.R.
241; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
46
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tory treatment."51 More common is when the state offers a benefit, but
does so in an under-inclusive way. This is the case when a program
purports to help all adults with disabilities, but dedicates more resources
to one group then another. 52
A challenge along these lines would be possible, but may prove
difficult and costly to litigate. Even if differential treatment could be
shown, the claimant would still have to establish that discrimination is at
the source of the distinction and that the benefit in question is "essential" and not merely "ancillary" to the right. 53 The problem is, of course,
that few Canadian jurisdictions consider aftercare to be an essential
service. This is reflected in the low priority given to community supports for adults and the fact few provinces make the legislative guarantee of the "least restrictive altemative". 54 Accordingly, falling short in
the provision of aftercare services would not engage section 15 in the
same way it did in Eldridge, where access to medical care itself was at
issue.

2. No Affirmative Right to Community Care
Unlike their American counterparts, Canadians with mental and physical disabilities do not have an affirmative right to receive support from
the community so they can live independently or at least semi-autonomously. In fact, it is debatable whether informal patients have the right
to treatment at all. Some claimants have suggested that not having the
option of less restrictive care deprives them of "security of the person"
and thus violates s. 7 of the Charter. The section reads as follows:
(7) Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice. 55

51

Eldridge, ibid. at para. 64.
The EAPD program mentioned in note 43 is a prime example.
53
Eldridge, supra note 50 at para. 71. The Court held that being able to communicate with
doctor is essential to getting medical treatment, and thus sign language translators do not
amount to an "ancillary" service.
54
This is discussed at length in part three - Nova Scotia as a Case Study.
55
Charter, supra note 39 at s. 7.

52
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Unfortunately, the vast majority of these claims have failed, largely
because of the Supreme Court's conservative stance on s. 7 rights. In the
monumental decision of Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), the Court
made it clear that s. 7 does not include property rights or rights of a
purely economic nature. 56 While there are some exceptions, they are
extremely limited. For example, the Court has held that a person's right
to "psychological integrity" (which is included in the s. 7 guarantee)
may have an economic component, but this aspect cannot be dominant. 57
The Court's rigid position makes it highly unlikely that an individual with mental illness would be able to rely on s. 7 to asse1t a right to
community care, and recent s. 7 claims brought by physically disabled
claimants have done nothing to suggest otherwise. If the court in those
cases was not convinced that entitlements like social assistance, 58 home
nursing, 59 and summer camp for children with cerebral palsy60 were
anything other than pure "economic rights," it is unlikely similar claims
by mentally ill individuals would be viewed any differently. While the
Charter is able to provide "freedom from" discrimination that affronts
the dignity of individuals; it is less likely to guarantee "freedom to" a
range of entitlements which might improve the lives of these same
individuals.

3. The American Experience
The situation for claimants is more prom1smg in the United States,
largely because of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which
became law in 1990, and the "due process" clause of the Constitution. 61
Similar to our section 15, Title II of the ADA proscribes that no qualified
individual with a disability be denied benefits and services "by reason of

56

[1989] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.) (QL).
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(J)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52 at
para 57 (S.C.C.) (QL). In this case, Lamer J. makes a distinction between the right to work,
which is strictly economic, and the right to pursue a livelihood which has non-economic
aspects.
58
Conrad, supra note 45 at para. 70.
59
Fernandes, supra note 49.
60
R.R., supra note 46.
61
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U .S.C.A. § 12101 ( 1990).
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such disability."62 The ADA, however, goes beyond the "freedom from"
justice offered by the Charter, mandating that all "public
entit(ies) ... administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities. " 63
The ADA makes treatment in the least restrictive manner a right,
albeit one subject to limitations. According to Olmstead v. L. C., the U.S.
Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation of section 35.130 (the socalled "integration regulation"), states are required to provide community-based resources when:
(a)

The State's treatment professionals determine placement to be
appropriate;

(b)

The affected persons do not oppose such treatment;

(c)

Placement can be reasonably accommodated taking into account
the resources to the State and the needs of others with mental
disabilities. 64

If each of these criteria are met, the State is required to accommodate the
disabled person in "a setting that enables (the) individual... to interact
with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible." 65
Of the three Olmstead requirements, the third poses the greatest
obstacle to claimants. Budgetary constraints, however, may relieve the
State of its duty to accommodate the plaintiff only temporarily. Once the
State can fulfill its obligations to the claimant without sacrificing the
interests of other mentally disabled persons, it must proceed with the
placement. 66 In the meantime, the State is expected to demonstrate that it
has an "effect(ive) working plan" and a "waiting list that (moves) at a
reasonable pace."67 This is a far cry from s. 15 Charter jurispmdence,
where virtually any claim pertaining to underinclusive legislation can be
tmmped by the government playing the financial stringency card.
Determining whether or not the State has the funds to make good on
reintegration efforts involves a delicate calculus. Rather than looking at
62
63

64
65

66
67

Ibid. at §12132.
Code of Federal Regulations 28 C.F.R. §35.130 (1990).
Olmstead v. L. C., 119 S. Ct. 2180 (1999) [Olmstead].
Ibid. at 2185
Ibid. at 2189.
Ibid.
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only how much it would cost to reintegrate the claimant, the court will
consider the expense of modifying the State's programs to accommodate others who fit into the same category. If "the requested modification would cause a 'fundamental alteration' of a state's services and
programs," the State will be able to justify the delay in placement. 68
Justice Ginsburg refers to this as the State's "affirmative defense." 69

IV. NOVA SCOTIA AS A CASE STUDY
Despite a long-standing commitment to using community programs to
assist and rehabilitate Nova Scotians with mental illness, complaints
that many of these individuals are falling through the cracks are as
pervasive as ever. In May 2000, Dr. Roger Bland and Dr. Brian Dufton
released Mental Health: A Time for Action, a detailed report prepared on
behalf of Nova Scotia's Department of Health (DoH). 7°Considering the
no less than thi1ty-six white papers and studies that came before it, the
report was aptly named: "[T]he title of the report captures a strong
theme ... that it is high time to take action and that there has been enough
talk and more than enough analysis of problems." 71
Bland and Dufton found a system that is in many places
underfunded, poorly organized, and out of touch with the mental health
consumer. Due to the split jurisdiction between the Department of
Health (which handles psychiatric in-patient care and treatment) and the
Department of Community Services (which handles aftercare services
like housing and welfare), there is a sense of fragmentation which can be
dizzying to the consumer. With few legislative guarantees in place,
Nova Scotians with mental illness have had to rely mainly on political
pressure and activism to encourage the government to address shortcomings in the system. As one might expect, this has been a slow and
grueling process. While some have found supportive community housing, effective counseling services, and long-tenn treatment programs,
68
69

70

71

Ibid. at 2188.
Ibid. note 64.
Bland & DuJlon, supra note 13.
Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 5.
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many others have been neglected, lost in the shuffle, and left to fend for
themselves.

1. Few Legislative Guarantees

Nova Scotians with a mental illness who have been discharged from the
hospital face an uncertain future. While there are programs to ease the
transition from hospital to community living, there are few statutory
assurances where aftercare services are concerned. For those committed
as involuntary patients under the Hospitals Act, there is no promise of
the "least restrictive alternative" and no guarantee of treatment consistent with mental health "best practices". 72
The Hospitals Act provides for methods of discharge but is silent on
what happens to the patient following release. 73 Once a review board
determines that a patient should not continue to be detained: "the facility
shall take such action as is required to give effect to such determination"
or the patient may remain as an informal patient, 74 subject to the written
consent of a qualified medical practitioner. 75 Presumably, the actions
required to effect release are something more than a handshake and a
shove in the right direction, but neither the Hospitals Act nor the
Regulations enacted pursuant to the Act elaborate on this.
Once returned to the community, discharged patients will in many
cases receive income support pursuant to the Employment Support and
Income Assistance Act (ESIAA}. 76 Under the ESIAA, benefits for individuals with disabilities are calculated on the same scale as "nonnal"
adults, with additional funds for medication and other special needs.
Individuals who qualify for housing assistance through the Department
of Community Services (DoCS) may be placed in a licensed group
home or small option home, depending on availability. Many care

Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208. For admission procedures, see sections 34-36 in
particular.
73
Ibid. at ss. 47, 63-65.
74
Ibid. at s. 68
75
Ibid. at s. 34(4)
76
Employment Support and Income Assistance Act, R.S.N.S. 2000, c. 27.
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homes in Nova Scotia are administered under the Homes for Special
Care Act, which provides for licensing procedures and basic care standards. 77

2. Mental Health Programs and Policies
i. Housing and Residential Care

Before an individual can receive a housing placement, they must first be
approved by the Community Supports for Adults section of the DoCS.
This involves a lengthy classification process which Bland and Dufton
call "cumbersome and antiquated." 78 The potential recipient is expected
to disclose current financial information as well as undergo a twelvepage psychosocial assessment. 79
Based on the results of the assessment, a case worker determines
whether the individual qualifies for placement. If so, they are assigned
to an appropriate care home. The process, however, is a lot less scientific than it might appear. Since there are long wait lists for virtually all
placements and programs, the matching process usually comes down to
"not what's the best option, but what's available," in the words of one
DoCS case worker. 80 As a result, consumers often find themselves in
large, institutional-seeming residences which are unable to meet their
individualized needs, forced to live with other people who have been
stamped with the "same label."81
Funding for licensed group home and long-term residential care
homes is provided on a per diem basis, 82 meaning there is constant
pressure to fill beds as soon as they become available. This encourages
home operators to accept individuals blindly, regardless of whether their
residence would make a good "fit". Those unhappy with their placement
N.S. Reg. 73/93, ss. 29-55.
Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 16.
79
Townsend, supra note 26. Examples of typical questions asked: "can you dress yourself'
and "can you do your own toileting"?
80 Townsend, supra note 26.
81 Kendrick, supra note 42 at 85-87.
82 "Per diem" refers to the set amount the care home receives from the DoCS for each
additional resident.
77
78
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or unwilling to live in a "highly structured" group home setting 83 can
choose instead to find their own accommodations. More often than not,
this can mean living in a slum-like apartment, boarding home, or worse
still - on the streets.

ii. Treatment

Studies indicate that continuity of treatment can vastly improve chances
of successfully reintegrating into the community following release. 84
For mental health consumers in Nova Scotia, aftercare treatment is
available on a variety of fronts. The DoH offers adult out-patient programs which include drug dependency programs, while the DoCS offers
emergency services and legal services. Help is also available from nonprofit agencies like the Canadian Mental Health Association, which
offer advocacy and skills training.
Although outreach programs such as the "Clubhouse" network run
by the Department of Health tend to be comprehensive and well-run,
there are not enough of these programs to meet the need, especially in
rural areas. 85 Especially lacking are assertive community treatment programs, to ensure that discharged patients continue to take their medication and meet their recovery schedule. 86
Without an adequate system of case management, it is common for
psychiatrists and nursing staff to "lose touch" with a patient once they
leave the hospital. The problem is compounded by the "split jurisdiction" between Health and Community Services. In the event an individual is forced to return to hospital, their file will be passed back to the
DoH, only to be passed back again to the DoCS upon discharge. This
elaborate game of departmental "hot potato" only serves to confuse
patients and disrupt recovery efforts.

83
Tooton, supra note 20. While some find the regimen imposed by many group homes to be
"comforting" others find these arrangements to be overly paternalistic and at times disrespectful. At some care homes, for example, residents are asked to leave in the morning and are not
allowed to return until 5 pm.
84
H. Branswell, "Patients benefit from continuity of care, researchers show readmittance less
likely with access to discharge records" The [Halifax] Chronicle-Herald (2 March 2002) A9.
85
Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 20.
86 Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 16.
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iii. Reintegration

As Justice Ginsburg suggests in Olmstead, the most "integrated setting"
is one where there is ample opportunity to interact with non-disabled
individuals. Unfortunately, this is often not possible in Nova Scotia
where highly structured, congregate settings are the norm and smaller,
more personalized options are increasingly scarce. As Kendrick suggests in his report on Community Based Options 87 (CBOs), the province
has gone from being a leader in the field and emphasizing CBOs, to
shelving many of these efforts in favour of group homes and long-term
care facilities. 88
The lack of CBOs creates a ripple effect throughout the system:
individuals in group homes have to wait for a more integrated placement, individuals in hospital have to wait for a space to open in a group
home, and individuals in the criminal justice system deemed not criminally responsible (NCR) have to wait in jail89 until a psychiatric bed
becomes available. For psychiatric patients and NCR offenders especially, the waiting game can entail a significant loss of freedom. NCR
offenders spend their time behind bars, while psychiatric patients are
forced to remain in acute units or are placed under adult protection until
a community placement becomes available. 90 This is unpleasant and can
further stigmatize an individual as "crazy'', making it even more difficult to gain acceptance in the mainstream.
The DoH established the "Clubhouse" system to help ease the
transition process and foster a sense of belonging and community often
missing in large, impersonal residences. At the Connections Clubhouse
in Halifax for example, members can sign up for a job placement
service, get computer training, buy second-hand clothes, find an apart87

This term refers to housing arrangements where two or three disabled individuals live
together, sometimes with a supervisor or non-disabled person(s) as well. CBO's are often
unlicensed and sometimes nothing more than a room rented out in a family home. Small group
homes, supported apartments, adult shared living, and adult family care are all examples of
CBO's.
88
Kendrick, supra note 42 at 14, 51-52.
89
This has become increasingly rare since a new forensic psychiatric hospital opened near
Halifax in October 200 I.
90
Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 17. Pam Townsend says people waiting to be discharged
may be given priority over individuals outside the formal system awaiting placement but
only if the person is considered "high risk".
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ment, as well as socialize with friends in the common room or barbecue
on the back deck. Being able to drop in for support and friendship makes
facing life post-discharge more manageable and imbues a sense of hope.
As one member puts it, "this is the place people go to find out they can
do something." 91

3. Restructuring Efforts
Health system reform has been on the government agenda for nearly a
decade, but mental health services in Nova Scotia have changed very
little during this time. In 1994, the Blueprint for Health System Reform
recommended that significant changes be made to the way health services are administered in the province, noting "our health system needs
substantial renovations, not just minor changes." 92

i. Community Support Model

Among suggestions for improving mental health services in the province, the Blueprint Committee recommended adopting the "Community
Support Model". The Model stresses a collaborative approach to planning and implementing care initiatives, with maximum flexibility to
accommodate the needs of individual consumers. 93
The government responded to the Blueprint by completely overhauling the administrative structure of health care in the province.
Responsibility for planning and implementing health services was
placed in the hands of nine District Health Authorities (DHAs), with a
network of Community Health Boards (CHBs) at the ground level. This
helped make the system more responsive to the needs of particular
regions and freed up resources in the provincial capital to focus on high
level planning.

Interview of "Leanne" and "Patrick", Clubhouse members, (1 March 2002) by author.
Nova Scotia, Blueprint for Health System Reform (Blueprint Committee, 1994) (Chair: D.R.
MacLean) at 8 [Blueprint].
93
Ibid. at 32.

91

92
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Unfortunately, the new structure has not had much effect on the lives
of Nova Scotians with mental illness, nor has it brought the province any
closer to achieving the Community Support Model. In fact, Tooton
suggests we are not even "1 %"towards recognizing this goal. 94 In 2000,
Bland and Dufton called on the province to make good on their pledge to
bring the Community Support Model to life in Nova Scotia. 95
The reality is that institutionalization and rehabilitation, rather than
community-based treatment, continue to be the primary focus of the
Department of Health. Despite calls to enlarge the role of infonnal
caregivers such as friends, family, and neighbours, the government has
not introduced mechanisms or incentives to make this happen. 96 Suggestions by the Blueprint Committee to establish a tax credit system for
those who care for loved ones in the home, and to provide service
allowances so that families can afford to hire a trained attendant, for
example, have yet to materialize. 97
There continues to be a feeling that consumers do not have a voice in
the process of designing and implementing mental health care. The
introduction of CHBs has helped because there tends to be grassroots
support for mental health initiatives at this level. 98 Still, the consumer
perspective can only truly be taken into account when it comes straight
from the consumer/survivor. There have been few concerted efforts to
make sure this happens. 99 Without the input of survivors who can attest
to the need for community-based care, many of these initiatives are
doomed to fall victim to cost-cutting bureaucrats.

ii. Funding

Limited funding continues to stand in the way of new initiatives. Of the
$626 million designated for the DoCS in the 2001-2002 Budget estimates, $124 million was supposed to go towards "community supports
Tooton, supra at note 20.
,Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 16.
96
See Blueprint, supra note 92 at 35; Kendrick, supra note 42 at 49-52.
97
Blueprint, supra note 92 at 37.
98
Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 24.
99
Tooton notes that on one committee assembled to look at consumer-led initiatives, fewer
than 50% of committee members are consumers!
94

95
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for adults". 100 These numbers are roughly in line with spending over the
last few years.
Kendrick suggests that significant cost savings could be achieved by
diverting more money to CBOs instead of into residentializing people,
which he considers an unsustainable practice. 101 The DoCS insists this is
already happening. One case worker told me that "all of our gross has
been in the smaller settings," with the real problem being "there are not
enough resources to go around." 102
To make better use of existing funds, the Blueprint suggests integrating all sources of provincial funding for mental health services into a
single envelope to be administered by the CHBs. 103 Bland and Dufton
disagree, contending that segregating mental health from other health
care services would produce a shortfall because money would inevitably
gravitate to more "glamorous" health care priorities. 104 Regardless of
which option is preferable, only a shift in spending priorities will
accomplish what aftercare services in the province need most - a fresh
infusion of funds.

iii. Continuity, Coordination and Cooperation

Psychiatric in-patients discharged in Halifax hospitals are more likely to
receive effective aftercare treatment today than they would have five
years ago, thanks to recent hospital-led initiatives. The "Share Care"
program run by Queen Elizabeth II Hospital (QEII) in downtown
Halifax is a prime example. Working in association with general practitioners and social workers from the Connections Clubhouse, QEII psychiatric nurses visit local shelters to monitor progress and distribute
medications where necessary. 105 This prevents discharged patients from
"losing touch" with the formal system. Greater continuity of care in tum

100
Nova Scotia, Estimates for the fiscal year 2001-2002 (Nova Scotia: Department of Finance,
2001) (The Hon. N.J. LeBlanc, Minister of Finance).
101
Kendrick, supra note 42 at 49-52.
102
Townsend, supra note 26.
103
Blueprint, supra note 92 at 34.
104
Bland & Dufton, supra note 13 at 22-24.
105
Tooton, supra note 20.
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helps prevent "revolving door" syndrome and tragic stories like that of
Jeffrey Arenburg.
The drawback of Share Care, like many programs of this type, is that
it only serves those classified as having a "severe and persistent mental
disorder," while leaving less chronic patients without much assistance. 106 To be sure, there are many concerned hospital staff who go out
of their way to help patients chart the next steps on the road to reintegration. This sort of assistance, however, is not mandated by the DoH - it is
strictly voluntary. The unfortunate reality, says housing expert Carol
Evans, is that clinicians reach out to staff at agencies like the Metro
Community Housing Association "only if they have the will" to do so. 107
A lack of coordination between the DoH and the DoCS serves as a
further obstacle for mental health consumers. Despite criticism of fragmentation brought on by Nova Scotia's split jurisdiction for mental
health services, there have been few attempts to make the system more
seamless. Kendrick's suggestion of administering treatment and aftercare within a single Mental Health Commission has gone ignored by all
but consumer advocates. 108 As a result, discharged patients have to cope
with needless bureaucracy and the run-around of dealing with several
different offices. Few know this better than individuals who have returned to hospital after time in the community. Once hospitalized for
more than thirty days, a patient ceases to be the responsibility of the
DoCS, meaning the individual's housing placement is lost. Even upon
leaving the hospital the discharged patient cannot pick up where they
left off - the DoCS requires that they be reclassified and sends them to
the back of the line for a residential placement.

V.

POSSIBILITIES FOR REDRESS

There are several avenues open to mental health consumers who feel
they are not being adequately served by the present system. Where an
Tooton, supra note 20.
Interview of Carol Evans, Executive Director of the Metro Community Housing Association in Halifax (27 February 2002) by author [Evans].
108 Kendrick, supra note 42 at 156.
106
107
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administrative decision is the source of the problem, an individual can
appeal to a provincial ombudsman and ask for relief directly from the
government. 109 There is also the possibility of taking "matters into one's
own hands" by pursuing litigation. This option might appeal to an
individual who has been hospitalized past the date of being cleared to
leave, or to someone who has been discharged but has floundered in
their new surroundings - both situations arising due to a lack of community placements and supports.
While successful tort actions may spur on legislators wary of future
lawsuits, statutory reform provides a more direct route to increasing the
level of community-based supports. Two possible refonns are explored
here: amending mental health legislation across the country to include a
promise of the "least restrictive alternative", and fleshing out this guarantee through a "Patients' Bill of Rights" for individuals with disabilities. The notion of achieving both through Comprehensive Mental
Health Legislation (CMHL) will also be examined.

1. Civil Actions

There are at least three possible scenarios in which a disgruntled psychiatric in-patient or former in-patient might bring a civil action. The first
scenario involves a standard "medical malpractice" claim, arising from
negligent treatment on the part of a psychiatrist or other care professional. Since this scenario does not speak to the issue of communitybased care it will not be explored further.
The second scenario is a variation on the first. Here, the psychiatric
in-patient has been cleared to leave the hospital but cannot do so
because of financial constraints, either his own or the department responsible for community placements. Adducing evidence about the
deleterious effects of institutional confinement, the would-be plaintiff
contends that he has been harmed by a course of treatment not suited to
his needs, and that the government or hospital's failure to provide a less
restrictive option amounts to negligence. This was essentially the
Gray, Shone & Liddle, supra note 38 at 59. Where the individual is being discriminated
against in the provision of private services and/or accommodation, they might also bring a
complaint pursuant to relevant provincial Human Rights legislation.
109
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appellant's pos1t1on in Fernandes, although that case was framed in
constitutional tenns. 110
There have been few attempts in Canada to seek damages where
hospitalization has can-ied on for too long, although claims of this sort
have been brought in the United States. 111 The reason is that few
Canadian courts acknowledge the "least restrictive alternative" as the
standard of care owed to psychiatric in-patients. This might change if
the "least restrictive alternative" was given expression in provincial
mental health statutes, or in separate legislation dealing with patients'
rights. Both these possibilities will be discussed in the next section.
Should "over-hospitalization" claims become viable, it may be advantageous, where legislation permits, for several plaintiffs to raise their
grievances together in a class action suit. 112 If one person is denied a
placement in the community owing to limited social service resources, it
is likely that others are similarly affected. Lynn Pierce argues in favour
of the class action route, noting that "strength in numbers" is especially
important for mentally ill claimants who may lack the financial resources to bring a challenge on their own. 113 Class actions would also
make sense for mental health consumers because the awareness generated by such claims might encourage legislative reform.
The third scenario where a psychiatric in-patient might bring a civil
action involves harm that occurs after treatment, once an individual has
been released into the community. As discussed earlier, moving from an
institution to the community is a leap that many do not make successfully. Little or no emphasis on discharge planning and continuity of
treatment following release stack the odds against smooth reintegration.
Some are able to make the transition and never look back; others
flounder in their new surroundings and end up living in filth and squalor,
penniless and without hope.
11
°Fernandes. supra note 49. Although the plaintiff Mr. Fernandes is physically disabled, not
mentally ill, his case is still germane to a discussion of civil remedies for those who remain
institutionalized against their will.
111 See e.g. Brewster v. Dukakis, 544 F. Supp 1069 (1982); New York ARC v. Carey, 393 F.
Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
112 Currently only British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec have legislation that provides for
class action lawsuits. See e.g. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.O. 1992, c. 6.
113 See L. Pierce, "Raising the Roof on Community Housing for People with Disabilities: Class
Actions in Canada" (2000) 6 Appeal: Review of Current Law and Law Reform 22.
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If the plight of someone in the latter category is the result of poor
discharge planning or the non-delivery of aftercare services, it may be
possible for the aggrieved individual to sue in tort. This sort of case
would hinge on the plaintiff drawing a causal connection between the
doctor or care provider's omission and the harm which ensued. The
plaintiff's case would also rest heavily on the notion that support in the
community is indispensable to coping with and recovering from mental
illness not a bold assertion in light of all the empirical evidence about
the aftermath of deinstitutionalization, outlined above. Failing to plan
for discharge or facilitate re-intake into the community would thus
amount to a breach of professional responsibility by the attending
psychiatrist or by the hospital itself.
Although few cases have been tried along these lines, the idea has
support within academic circles. Jonathan Bach suggests that the common law "recognizes a continuing duty of care that extends beyond the
technical termination of the patient's institutional stay," and that failing
to plan for an in-patient's future past the date of release "exposes a
recipient of aid to reasonably foreseeable harm." 114 Similarly, Gray
notes that community treatment requirements may exist in certain provinces by virtue of legislation relating to leave certificates and CTOs. For
example, a leave certificate cannot be issued in Manitoba unless the
course of treatment described in the certificate "can and will be provided
in the community." 115
Still, it is unlikely that these actions would succeed in Canada
because of the court's reluctance to impose duties on administrative
decision-makers that do not arise directly from statutes. 116 Furthermore,
where there is a duty to be met, the court will generally look to statutory
standards to determine the level of care required - standards lacking in
provinces like Nova Scotia. 117 In other words, unless a physician acted
with complete disregard for the interests of his patient, it is unlikely the
court will view his inaction as tortious, even if it is indisputably "negligent" in the colloquial sense.
Bach, "Deinstitutionalization", supra note 15 at 1161.
Gray, Shone & Liddle, supra note 38 at 309-310.
116
Gray, Shone & Liddle, supra note 38 at 310.
117
The position most frequently taken in Canadian courts is that "breach of a statutory
provision is prima facie evidence of negligence." See A.M. Linden & L.N. Klar, Canadian
Tort Law: Cases, Notes & Materials, 11'11 ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999) at 191-193.
114
115
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2. Legislative reform
i. The Least Restrictive Alternative

The "least restrictive" or "least intrusive" alternative refers to a set of
circumstances in which the psychiatric patient's freedom and autonomy
is interfered with only to an extent commensurate with his or her
medical need. 118 The "least restrictive alternative" is not the same thing
as the "ideal" or "perfect" alternative because this would necessarily
entail not having an illness in the first place. Rather, the "least restrictive
alternative" is a workable compromise between the paternalistic impulses of the state and the liberty interests of the individual.
Among Canadian jurisdictions, Manitoba, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut offer a legislative guarantee of the "least restrictive
alternative". 119 The spirit of the "least restrictive alternative" is also
represented in the Preamble to New Brunswick's Mental Health Act, 120
and in Criminal Review Board hearings for individuals found NCR,
where the Board must balance the interests of public safety with the
rights of the accused to be placed in "the least onerous and least
restrictive" setting. 121 Principles of the least restrictive alternative have
been given wide application in the United States, with fourteen states
adopting the concept as part of their legislative framework. 122
Adding the least restrictive alternative to mental health legislation in
Nova Scotia would help generate momentum for community-based care
in several ways. First, it would send a message to health care providers
that the rights of psychiatric in-patients matter, and that knee-jerk
institutionalization is no longer an option. On a more operational level,
patients seeking discharge could rely on a least restrictive clause to
buttress their case for release. For example, mandating that psychiatric
review boards consider the least restrictive alternative would have a

118
At least, this is how I wish to define the "least restrictive alternative" for the purposes of this
paper.
119
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significant influence on these proceedings. 123 The legislation could even
go so far as creating a presumption of community care, unless it is
otherwise shown that the individual is a danger to herself or others. 124
A guarantee of the least restrictive alternative would also encourage
better aftercare planning and treatment, by raising the standard of care
expected of hospitals and care providers (discussed in the previous
section). The standard set by the statute, although not detenninative,
would at least influence the court's perception of what is "reasonable."
For example, if an individual's needs are best met in the community, but
there has been no attempt to accommodate individuals of this type in
their area of settlement, the local municipality or social service department might be held accountable. This could inspire lawmakers to get
serious about community care and the provision of affordable housing.
The Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia recently considered
the possibility of adding a "least restrictive" clause to the Hospitals Act,
but found doing so would "create the potential for confusion" because
the notion of the least restrictive alternative is "unduly broad". 125 This
may very well be the case, but only if the least restrictive clause was
introduced on its own, without any other changes or additions to Nova
Scotia's mental health laws. A more comprehensive approach would
answer to the Commission's criticism, as well as help bring the Hospitals Act in line with Charter values. 126 This would include a clear
enunciation of principles by which mental health care will be measured,
as well as a set of "best practices" for hospitals in particular to help
realize this vision.

ii. Patients' Bill of Rights
Introduced on its own, it is unlikely that creating a statutory right of the
least restrictive alternative in Nova Scotia would provide the necessary
For example, the clause could be inserted under s. 63 of the Hospitals Act which explains
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impetus for a restructuring of service priorities by the provincial government. In order to move things in this direction, the government's commitment to community-based care must be set down in a quasi-constitutional document, such as a Patients' Bill of Rights, or what Gray refers
to as Comprehensive Mental Health Legislation (CMHL). 127
Although space does not permit a full discussion of what a Patients'
Bill of Rights or CMHL should include, there are certain fundamentals
that can be touched on briefly. A Patients' Bill of Rights should affinn
the dignity of all individuals with mental illness. It should acknowledge
the duty of the state to protect individuals with mental illness from
exploitation and abuse, while at the same time respecting the right of
these individuals to live freely in the community. 128 It should recognize
that mental health is closely connected to other aspects of daily life, such
as work, education, diet, and recreation. 129 There must be a commitment
to preventative care and early intervention, as well as to offering the
"least restrictive alternative" in the event compulsory treatment is required. A Patients' Bill of Rights should allude to the fact that discharge
planning is indispensable to making the transition from hospital to the
community, while CMHL could provide for administrative mechanisms
needed to ensure this planning takes place.
In addition to a general Patients' Bill of Rights, Nova Scotia should
follow Kendrick's recommendation of adopting specific standards
which will govern the operation of CBOs. 130 In November 1996, the
DoCS released a set of interim standards for CBOs 131 but have yet to
settle on a final version. It is imperative that specific guidelines be
imposed on CBOs, especially because many of these arrangements are
unlicensed and not subject to inspections like other residences under the
Homes for Special Care Act.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

So the Etemal's anger blazed against Israel, and he made them wander
up and down the desert for forty years, till all the generation that had
done evil in the sight of the Eternal had perished.
Numbers 32: 13

It has been a long and often painful forty years for Canadians with

mental illness since deinstitutionalization efforts got underway on a
wide scale in the 1960s. While some have reached the "promised land"
and found healthy, productive lives in the community, many others have
been "left adrift" by a health care system which has often failed to
recognize that community support and nurturing are as essential, or
more essential, to well-being than all the world's psychotropic drugs put
together. Still others have seen their hopes and dreams of living in the
"mainstream" or receiving the "least restrictive alternative" dashed by
inadequate funding or shortsighted legislative priorities.
Justice for these individuals, it seems, staiis with the recognition that
community-based care and treatment is a right, not just some looselyworded promise which is subject to endless qualification. Since it is
unlikely this right will emerge from Charter jurisprudence or test cases,
it is incumbent on Canadian lawmakers to take the lead and pursue 21st
century solutions for people with mental illness, rather than quick fix
"institutionalizing" or "residentializing". Passing a comprehensive Patients' Bill of Rights would be a step in the right direction as would
amendments to provincial mental health legislation which create a
presumption of the "least restrictive" care and make discharge planning
mandatory.
In Nova Scotia, the writing is on the wall: the current system is
failing mental health consumers. Another report or white paper need not
be unveiled to tell the government what Nova Scotians with mental
illness have known for a long time - that housing and aftercare services
in the province, while excellent where they can be found, are nowhere
close to meeting their need, and that "a deep sense of despair" exists as a
result. 132 It is only when a true path is created for these individuals that
they will be able to end their wandering, and experience the "milk and
honey" of justice and opportunity.
M. Lightstone, "Disabled bemoan inaction on group homes" The [Halifax] ChronicleHerald (15 February 2002).
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